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ABSTRACT
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Robinson granted police broad authority to
search arrestees’ personal property. Robinson’s broad rule
has not been significantly limited and appears increasingly
anachronistic in an age of rapidly advancing mobile
technologies. Whether upholding or invalidating such
searches, courts have relied on reasoning that ignores or
conflicts with Robinson. This Article illustrates four
problematic contrivances used by state and federal courts:
(1) the comparison of mobile devices to “containers; (2)
the misinterpretation of United States v. Chadwick’s
concept of “property not immediately associated with the
person;” (3) the unjustifiable application of Arizona v.
Gant’s “reason to believe” rationale; and (4) the baseless
categorical exclusion of cell phones from the search
incident doctrine. In light of the public’s apparently high
expectation of privacy for information stored on mobile
devices, this Article recommends two possible solutions for
restricting police authority: (1) return to an exigency-based
rationale following Chimel v. California or (2) look to state
legislatures to curb police powers through law making.
*
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INTRODUCTION
The technological innovations of the digital age have certainly
added “grist to the mill” 1 of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
1

Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127 (1974) (“[T]he
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particular, the proliferation and advancement of digital media and
portable storage devices allow individuals to carry virtual
warehouses of highly personal information. In all but one state,2
arrests for an infraction as slight as a traffic violation may allow
arresting officers to conduct unrestricted, warrantless searches of
electronic devices under the Fourth Amendment’s search-incidentto-arrest exception. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
spoken directly about the constitutionality of warrantless cell
phone searches incident to arrest. However, state and federal courts
interpret past Supreme Court rulings to allow police almost
unrestricted authority.
Most scholars, and a few courts, have recoiled from such broad
authority to search and have crafted arguments that appear to
rescue cell phones from the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
Closer inspection of several major arguments reveals flaws in their
reasoning that ultimately render these positions unworkable. A
common theme among these arguments is the failure to confront
the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. Robinson, which
explicitly grants police broad authority to search all property found
on an arrestee’s person. 3 This Article suggests that restoring the
original policy interests of Chimel v. California4 offers the only
persuasive means of confronting the broad search authority of
Robinson. The law must return to the exigency-based roots of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception: officer safety and evidence
preservation.
Part I briefly surveys the search-incident-to-arrest exception to
the warrant requirement, including its roots in the Fourth
Amendment, its later development and expansion, and the courts’
recent application of the doctrine to cell phones. Part II introduces
and rebuts four common arguments used by courts to limit the
general authority of police to search mobile phone contents
incident to lawful arrest. These are (1) the irrelevant comparison of
cell phones to physical “containers;” (2) the misinterpretation of
confirmed Fourth Amendment buff is never in want of grist for his mill.”).
2
At the time of writing, Ohio is the only state prohibiting cell phone
searches incident to arrest. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
3
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
4
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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United States v. Chadwick’s concept of property “not immediately
associated with the person” 5 as a categorical exception to the
search-incident-to-arrest exception; (3) the inability to justify the
application of Arizona v. Gant’s evidence-based “reason to
believe” rationale to cell phone searches; 6 and (4) the baseless
categorical exclusion of cell phones from the search-incident-toarrest doctrine, pioneered by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v.
Smith. 7
In light of the public’s apparently high expectation of privacy
for information accessible through cell phones, Part III advocates
two possible approaches for restricting police access during
searches incident. First, a potential judicial rule may return courts’
focus to the exigency-based rationale first articulated in Chimel. 8
Second, state legislatures offer a more likely avenue for reform. A
legislative solution can directly address the public’s privacy
concerns, avoid the jurisprudential morass of the Fourth
Amendment, and remain adaptable to future evolution of portable
technologies.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment and the
Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception
The Fourth Amendment forbids the government from
conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.” 9 An
unreasonable search occurs when governmental action violates an
individual’s “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy.
Such a violation exists when “a person [has] exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and . . . society is prepared to
recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’” 10 Warrantless
5

433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
7
920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
8
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
Katz. v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
6
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infringements on legitimate privacy interests are normally deemed
per se unreasonable. 11 If the warrant requirement serves as a gate
that separates law enforcement from citizens’ private lives, then
magistrates play the gatekeeper. Magistrates only issue search
warrants if the government has shown a great enough need to
justifiably infringe on an individual’s particular privacy interests. 12
At the same time, however, the United States Supreme Court
recognizes “a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions” that allow the government to sidestep the normal
warrant requirement. 13
One such exception is for searches incident to lawful arrest.
Current criminal procedure treats the warrantless search of an
arrestee’s person as a definite right of the police. However,
historical records dating back to the 18th century illustrate searches
far more limited in scope. 14 From the late 19th century and into the
20th century, searches incident to arrest were permitted out of the
police’s need to disarm potentially violent suspects. Police were
also allowed to search arrestees to secure evidence material to the
particular crime of arrest. 15
11

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (“[Magistrates issue
warrants] so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy
in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals.”) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56
(1948)).
13
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
14
Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 381, 385 (2001).
15
United States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (“[T]he
property must be material, or seem to be material, as evidence on the charge
which is made against the defendant.”); Thatcher v. Weeks, 11 A. 599 (Me.
1887) (finding officers entitled to seize items “that may be of use as evidence
upon the trial”); Holker v. Hennesey, 42 S.W. 1090, 1093 (Mo. 1897) (“[A]n
officer has no right to take any property from the person of the prisoner, except
such as may afford evidence of the crime charged . . . .”); Dillon v. O'Brien, 16
Cox Crim. Cas. 245, 249 (Exchequer Div. 1887) (“[C]onstables . . . are entitled,
upon a lawful arrest by one of them charged with treason or felony to take and
detain property found in his possession, which will form material evidence in his
prosecution for that crime.”); see Joseph H. Beale, Jr., CRIMINAL PLEADING AND
PRACTICE § 29, 24-25 (1889) (“Any article found upon the prisoner which is
12
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In 1914, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the
topic of searches incident to arrest as dictum in Weeks v. United
States. 16 Weeks involved a warrantless seizure of papers belonging
to the defendant in the defendant’s absence. The Court explicitly
distinguished the issue of search incident to arrest:
What, then, is the present case? Before answering
that inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process
of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an
assertion of the right on the part of the government,
always recognized under English and American
law, to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or
evidences of crime. The right has been uniformly
maintained in many cases . . . . 17
Today’s conception of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
did not emerge until the Court’s decision in Chimel v. California.18
In Chimel, police executed an arrest warrant for an individual at his
house who was suspected of burglarizing a coin store. Without the
defendant’s consent or a valid search warrant, police spent nearly
an hour exploring the three-bedroom house, attic, and garage for
evidence of the burglary. During the search, they uncovered coins
and other items which were later used to convict defendant. 19
Breaking with precedent that allowed similar but more limited
searches, 20 the Court invalidated the search of the appellant’s home
needed as evidence to prove the crime, or any property of another which he
acquired by the crime, may be taken from him.”); Francis Wharton, TREATISE
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 2975, at 39 (7th ed. 1874)
(“Those arresting a defendant are bound to take from his person any articles
which may be of use as proof in the trial of the offense with which the defendant
is charged.”). See generally Logan, supra note 14, at 388-89 (2001).
16
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17
Id. at 392; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(reiterating Weeks dicta).
18
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
19
Id. at 753-54.
20
See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (upholding
warrantless search of defendant’s one-room office for forged stamps incident to
arrest); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (upholding warrantless
search of four-room apartment for stolen checks incident to arrest).
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as unreasonably broad. While a “strictly limited right” permitted
police to search the person and the area of “immediate control” of
an arrestee, the majority found that the Fourth Amendment forbids
general search of premises. 21 In limiting the scope of searches
incident to arrest, the Court identified officer safety and
preservation of evidence as the two determinative social policy
considerations behind the exception:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction. 22
The Court then extended these policy concerns to the area within
an arrestee’s reach:
[T]he area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table
or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be
as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search
of the arrestee's person and the area “within his
immediate control”—construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 23
The Court held that the trial court should have suppressed the
resulting evidence because the police search of Chimel’s house

21

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
Id. at 762-63.
23
Id. at 763.
22
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extended beyond the area of “immediate control.” 24
In 1973, United States v. Robinson answered a looming
question left by Chimel: can factual circumstances limit an
officer’s authority to conduct a search incident to an arrest? 25
Unlike Chimel, the search in Robinson bore no apparent relation to
the underlying offense. In Robinson, police recognized a motorist
and had reason to believe he was driving with a revoked operator’s
permit. An officer stopped Robinson and asked to see his license.
When he produced a fake, the officer arrested him and subjected
him to a “full ‘field type search,’” a standard procedure within the
officer’s department. 26 That search produced a crumpled cigarette
pack from Robinson’s coat pocket, containing fourteen heroin
capsules. The appellate court suppressed the drugs as evidence and
found that, where nothing justifies a search for additional evidence
of the crime of arrest, the search must be limited to a “frisk” for
weapons. 27 The Supreme Court reversed, pronouncing an
“unqualified authority” of police to search the person of an arrestee
incident to lawful arrest: 28
The authority to search . . . while based upon the
need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not
depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. 29
Under this bright-line rule, the circumstantial facts of a particular
arrest did not influence the police’s right to search:
24

Id. at 768.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
26
Id. at 221-22 n.2.
27
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
banc).
28
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 225.
29
Id. at 235.
25
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It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes
the authority to search, and we hold that in the case
of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment. 30
With Robinson, the Court effectively severed the search-incidentto-arrest exception from a fact-based analysis. As long as an
officer executes a lawful arrest, he or she may conduct a “full”
search of the arrestee and, by the implication of Chimel, the area
within the arrestee’s “immediate control.”
However, Robinson significantly departed from Supreme Court
precedent on the search-incident-to-arrest exception. 31 Prior cases
required either an evidentiary link that tied the object of the search
to the basis for the arrest or an evident threat to police safety. 32 By
allowing a search incident to arrest wherever a lawful arrest
occurs, the Robinson Court removed such factual considerations
from the equation.
The most recent Supreme Court examination of the searchincident-to-arrest doctrine came in 2009 with Arizona v. Gant, 33 in
which the Court backed away from a bright-line authorization to
search automobiles incident to arrest. In Gant, police received an
30

Id.
Id. at 233 ( “While . . . earlier authorities are sketchy, they tend to
support the broad statement of the authority to search incident to arrest found in
the successive decisions of this Court, rather than the restrictive one which was
applied by the Court of Appeals in this case.”). But see id. at 249 (“No precedent
is cited for this broad assertion—not surprisingly, since there is none. Indeed,
we only recently rejected such a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and
regulation under the Amendment, (for) it obscures the utility of limitations upon
the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional
regulation. This Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable
intensity and scope.”) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32
See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (“[T]he incident
search was obviously justified ‘by the need to seize weapons and other things
which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime.’”) (quoting Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
33
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
31

296

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:4

anonymous tip reporting suspected drug activity at a house. When
they discovered that one resident had an outstanding warrant for
driving with a suspended license, police waited until he arrived at
the house in his car. An officer arrested Gant and secured him in
the patrol car’s back seat. As Gant sat handcuffed, officers
searched his vehicle and uncovered a firearm and a bag of cocaine.
The Supreme Court used Gant to redefine and narrow the
parameters of acceptable searches of vehicles incident to arrest, as
originally outlined in New York v. Belton. 34 The Court rejected a
broad reading of Belton that would allow a vehicle search-incidentto-arrest even when the arrestee was secured and unable to access
the vehicle’s interior. 35 Instead, the Gant Court agreed with the
Arizona Supreme Court that such an expansive right of police
conflicts with the dual policy considerations of Chimel. 36 In an
attempt to reunite Belton with Chimel, the majority fashioned a
new test for vehicle searches incident to arrest:
[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a
vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search.
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we
also conclude that circumstances unique to the
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful
arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.” 37
Using the new test, the Court invalidated the search of Gant’s car,
since Gant was not in reaching distance of the passenger
compartment and the officer had no reason to believe evidence
34

453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Gant, 556 U.S. at 342-43.
36
Id. at 343 (“To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to
every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception . . . .”).
37
Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
35
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relating to the crime (driving with a suspended license) would be
found in the car. 38 Importantly, Gant reintroduced factual analysis
to one region of the search incident exception.
B. Searches of Digital Devices Incident to Arrest
One justification behind the Robinson bright-line rule is that an
officer should have the power to thoroughly investigate potential
dangers hidden in an arrestee’s clothing or containers. 39 Since the
flood of portable electronics, searches incident to arrest have
inevitably extended to devices such as pagers and cell phones.
While courts uniformly recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the digital content of these devices and an
accompanying right to challenge related governmental intrusions, 40
a majority of courts currently uphold such searches.
1. Lower Courts Permitting Searches of Cell Phones
Robinson’s rule provides rich fodder for lower courts
upholding searches of digital devices incident to arrest, and courts
are keen to adhere to its framework. Many courts favor the
“container” analogy lifted from Robinson. Since Robinson focused
on the permissibility of a search of a physical container found on
the arrestee’s person, many lower courts simply characterize
pagers and cell phones as electronic containers.
38

Id.
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631-32 (2004) (“[A]uthority
to search an arrestee's person does not depend on the actual presence of one of
Chimel's two rationales in the particular case; rather, the fact of arrest alone
justifies the search.”) (Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
40
See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“[Defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call records and
text messages on the cell phone and that he therefore has standing to challenge
the search.”); see also City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) ("Cell phone and text message communications
are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or
necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.").
39
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One of the earliest cases to apply the container analogy to
pagers was United States v. Chan. 41 During a sting operation, DEA
agents arrested two heroin dealers who coordinated a sale through
one of the defendant’s pager. After the arrest, an officer seized the
pager, accessed its memory, and recovered numbers associated
with the drug deal. In his defense, Chan argued that the pager was
a container, and that the agents unjustifiably searched it incident to
arrest because of the high expectation of privacy associated with its
contents. 42 The court quickly rejected Chan’s argument. Under
Belton, “the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has
no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee
may have.” 43
United States v. Finley was one of the first cases to validate the
search of a cell phone incident to arrest. 44 In Finley, police
conducted a controlled purchase of methamphetamine. Finley
drove the seller to the prearranged location and immediately after
the exchange was made police arrested both individuals. During
the arrest, officers found a cell phone in Finley’s pocket. A later
search of the phone’s stored text messages revealed several
references to narcotics.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the lawfulness of the search under the
Fourth Amendment. 45 Finley argued his cell phone ought to be
treated as a closed container, but mistakenly relied on authority
that suppressed a search of a closed container but did not involve
an exception to the warrant requirement. 46 Like in Chan, once the
cell phone bore the brand of a “container,” the Finley court
invoked the categorical rule of Robinson, along with other cases
explicitly ruling on container searches incident to arrest. 47 Many
cases have relied on the Finley decision to uphold the cell phone41

830 F. Supp. 531, 533 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 535.
43
Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981)).
44
477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
45
Id. at 259.
46
Id. at 260.
47
Id. at 260-61 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223-24
(1973); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-461 (1981)).
42
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container analogy. 48
Pagers and cell phones have also been analogized to address
books and wallets, searches of which incident to arrest are
traditionally permitted. In United States v. Cote, police searched
the call logs and electronic phone book of a cell phone belonging
to a man arrested for soliciting sex from a minor. 49 The court
upheld the search and found the analogy of a cell phone to a wallet
or address book fitting because both “would contain similar
information.” 50 According to this perspective, items like wallets,
photographs, and address books better approximate the function of
cell phones. For example, much of what they contain, such as text
messages, contact lists, and photographs, could just as easily
appear on a piece of paper. Just as those papers are searchable
incident to arrest, so too are their digital counterparts. 51
2. Cases Restricting Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest
A minority of state and federal courts have suppressed
evidence obtained from cell phones incident to arrest. The U.S.
district court in United States v. Park found that a heightened
privacy interest in the contents of mobile phones justified their
protection from searches incident to arrest. 52 In Park, the police
arrested Park for marijuana cultivation and seized his cell phone.
Police later searched the phone and copied down names and phone
48

See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 714 (5th Cir. 2011)
(upholding search incident of text messages); United States v. Gomez, 807 F.
Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (upholding the Finley decision in the
context of a caller ID; describing Finley as “the leading case on this issue”);
United States v. Rodriguez, No. C-11-344, 2011 US Dist. LEXIS 100433, at *11
(S.D. Texas Sept. 6, 2011) (upholding the Finley decision in the context of
incriminating cell phone photographs).
49
No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005).
50
Id. at *6.
51
See, e.g., United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at
*4 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009) (“[It] is an electronic ‘container,’ in that it stores
information that may have great evidentiary value . . . . While such electronic
storage devices are of more recent vintage than papers, diaries, or traditional
photographs, the basic principle still applies: incident to a person's arrest, a
mobile phone or beeper may be briefly inspected [for evidence].”).
52
No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).

300

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:4

numbers stored in its memory.
Breaking with other courts’ reliance on Robinson, 53 the Park
court turned to United States v. Chadwick 54 for support. 55 In
Chadwick, the Supreme Court suppressed evidence recovered from
a locked container. The Court reasoned that “[b]y placing personal
effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested
an expectation that the contents would remain free from public
examination.” Therefore, the footlocker deserved protection under
the Fourth Amendment warrant clause “[n]o less than one who
locks the doors of his home against intruders . . . .” 56 Chadwick
distinguished property searched incident to arrest based on whether
the property was “immediately associated with the person.” 57
According to the Court, a valid search of property “not
immediately associated with the person” requires: (1) the search
not be remote in time or place from the arrest; and (2) some form
of exigent circumstances compels the search. 58 Furthermore, the
Court held:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced
luggage or other personal property not immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger
that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that
property is no longer incident of the arrest. 59
The Park court fundamentally distinguished its case from Finley
by finding that cell phones should not be considered property that
is immediately associated with an arrestee’s person, implicitly
comparing the searched cell phone to the locked footlocker of
Chadwick. According to Park, “[t]his is so because modern
cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of
53

See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007), supra
notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
54
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
55
Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at *6.
56
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
57
Id. at 15.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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private information.” 60 Given the “increasingly blurry” line
between cell phones and computers, the court feared that “[a]ny
contrary holding could have far-ranging consequences.” 61
The Ohio Supreme Court case State v. Smith was the first case
to specifically prohibit cell phone searches incident to arrest. 62 In
Smith, the court suppressed evidence from a cell phone search on
the grounds that the expansive privacy interests in cell phone
contents rendered the container analogy entirely inapplicable. 63
The court began by reviewing approaches to characterizing cell
phones: “Whether the warrantless search of a cell phone passes
constitutional muster depends upon how a cell phone is
characterized, because whether a search is determined to be
reasonable is always fact-driven.” 64 It then examined Finley and
Park, the two “leading” cases on the subject. 65 The defendant in
Finley conceded that “the officers' post-arrest seizure of his cell
phone from his pocket was lawful, but he argued that, since a cell
phone is analogous to a closed container, 66 the police had no
authority to examine the phone's contents without a warrant.” 67
Because the defendant had not invoked a container analogy, the
Smith court found Finley inapplicable to its decision. 68 Briefly
addressing Park, the Smith majority noted that the Park court
found “significant privacy interests” in cell phones, due to their
60

Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8.
Id. (Park also rebuked the investigatory nature of the search, stating that
the officer’s search of Park’s cell phone went “beyond the original rationales for
searches incident to arrest.” However, the court here appears to have overlooked
Robinson’s explicit indifference to the actual presence of Chimel’s dual
rationales incident to arrest.); see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973); supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
62
State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
63
Id. at 954-55.
64
Id. at 952. But see People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) (finding
inappropriate any inquiry into character of property in context of search incident
to arrest under Robinson); United States v. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 68 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011) (using the same
reasoning as Diaz).
65
Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 953-54.
66
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
67
Id.
68
Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 953.
61
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“capacity for storing immense amounts of private information.” 69
The court rejected the container analogy, an approach
advocated by the state. 70 Eschewing all figurative conceits, the
court clarified that “[a container] means ‘any object capable of
holding another object,’” 71 which “must actually have a physical
object within it.” 72 Such a rigid definition left no room for
electronic storage devices since “[e]ven the more basic models of
modern cell phones are capable of storing a wealth of digitized
information wholly unlike any physical object found within a
closed container.” 73
Smith found no satisfactory classification for cell phones in use
by courts. The “multifunctional” nature of cell phones was
compared to traditional address books, which are entitled to a
lower expectation of privacy compared to laptop computers in a
search incident to arrest. 74 Although cell phones are “still, in
essence, phones” and not computers, 75 the court found the “large
amounts of private data” on cell phones sufficiently gave their
owners a heightened expectation of privacy in that information. 76
Smith concluded:
Once the cell phone is in police custody, the state
has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting and
preserving evidence and can take preventative steps
to ensure that the data found on the phone are
neither lost nor erased. But because a person has a
high expectation of privacy in a cell phone’s
contents, police must then obtain a warrant before
intruding into the phone’s contents. 77
69

Id. (quoting United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375, 2007 WL 1521573, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007)).
70
Id. at 953-54.
71
Id. at 954 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. (citing no sources in support of alleged higher expectation of privacy
attributed to laptops).
75
Id. at 955.
76
Id.
77
Id. Note that, like Park, Smith admonishes any search done in the absence
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While not expressly stating it, the Smith majority effectively
fashioned a new rule disqualifying cell phones from the searchincident-to-arrest exception. The three dissenting justices attacked
the majority for announcing “a sweeping new Fourth Amendment
rule that is at odds with decision of other courts,” when traditional
Fourth Amendment principles governing searches incident to arrest
could have decided the case. 78 According to the dissent, since only
the cell phone’s call log was searched, the majority should have
accordingly confined its inquiry. 79 Because a phone’s call log
approximates the function of a traditional address book, which
police are permitted to search incident to arrest, the dissent argued
evidence gleaned from the call logs should not have been
suppressed. 80
3. United States v. Robinson’s Relevance to Cell Phones
The Smith decision incited significant criticism from other
courts for treading so far from Robinson’s categorical rule. 81 While
the Smith dissent strayed little from the analysis of Finley, 82 a
reaction more fundamentally attuned to Robinson arrived from the
Florida District Court of Appeals in Smallwood v. State. 83
Affirming the admission of incriminating photographs stored
on a cell phone, the trial court decision in Smallwood adhered
strictly to the language of Robinson permitting a “full” search of an

of Chimel’s justifications (officer safety and preservation of evidence), and
thereby is inconsistent with Robinson’s express disavowal of those justifications
when an officer searches a suspect incident to arrest. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
78
Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 956 (Cupp, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 956-57.
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 n.17 (Cal. 2011).
82
Compare United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007)
(validating the search of a cell phone incident to arrest), with State v. Smith, 920
N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009) (disqualifying cell phones from the search incident
exception).
83
61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 113 So.3d 724 (Fla.
2013). For a discussion of the Florida Supreme Court’s reversal, see infra notes
177 to 185 and accompanying text.
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arrestee’s person. 84 The court took issue with restrictive
approaches used by other courts. Smallwood first criticized the
container analogy, observing that in Robinson, Belton, and Chimel,
“nothing in these decisions even hints that whether a warrant is
necessary for a search of an item properly seized from an arrestee’s
person incident to a lawful arrest depends in any way on the
character of the seized item.” 85
Accordingly, the Smallwood court noted, “whether or not a cell
phone is properly characterized as a traditional ‘container’ is
irrelevant to whether or not it is searchable upon arrest.” 86 No
language permits a court to exclude cell phones from searches
incident to arrest under Robinson’s grant of authority to arresting
officers to search any items on the person or within the immediate
control of the arrestee. Smallwood also relied on Robinson to
discredit the argument that an officer must reasonably believe a
cell phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest in order to
search the phone. Instead, the Robinson court found irrelevant
“what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
upon the person of the suspect.” 87 Hence, “clearly the Supreme
Court has established a bright-line rule permitting a search incident
to arrest, regardless of whether an officer had reason to believe
evidence would be found.” 88
Even in light of the “vast amount of personal information”
stored on mobile phones, the Smallwood court felt “bound by
Supreme Court precedent” to allow the search. 89 The court
observed that Robinson permitted the search of similar information
contained in address books and wallets. However, the court
expressed “great concern” in this new application of Robinson to
84

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
Smallwood, 61 So.3d at 455 (quoting Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 at 507).
86
Id. at 460.
87
Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
88
Id; see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (noting “[i]n
Robinson, we held that the authority to conduct a full field search as incident to
arrest was a ‘bright-line rule,’ which was based on the concern for officer safety
and destruction or loss of evidence, but which did not depend in every case upon
the existence of either concern.”).
89
Smallwood, 61 So.3d at 461.
85
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cell phones, since “the Robinson court could not have
contemplated the nearly infinite wealth of personal information
cell phones and other similar electronic devices can hold.” 90 In
view of the many functions of modern cell phones, including their
ability to access content on the Internet, the Smallwood court
perceived that cell phones “can make the entirety of one’s personal
life available for perusing by an officer every time someone is
arrested for any offense.” The court reasoned that “this result could
not have been . . . intended by the Robinson court.” 91 The
Smallwood court recognized the Gant court’s concerns about
“giving officers unbridled discretion to rummage” without reason
to believe evidence of the crime of arrest will be found. 92
Displaying great anxiety over the implications of its holding, the
Smallwood court noted:
Were we free to do so, we would find, given the
advancement of technology with regards to cell
phones and similar portable electronic devices,
officers may only search cell phones incident to
arrest if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest might be found on the
phone. 93
The opinion ended by posing this question of “great public
importance” 94: “Does the holding in [Robinson] allow a police
officer to search through photographs contained within a cell
phone which is on an arrestee’s person at the time of a valid arrest,
notwithstanding that there is no reasonable belief that the cell
phone contains evidence of any crime?” 95
Smallwood illustrates the predicament of current criminal
procedure regarding searches of cell phones and other digital
devices incident to arrest. The more that the courts appreciate the
full range of digital information implicated by the Robinson line of
90

Id.
Id.
92
Id. at 462. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
93
Smallwood, 61 So.3d at 462.
94
Id.
95
Id. (emphasis in original).
91
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cases, the more they appear to recoil from it. Decisively, the Smith
court was only able to protect the individual’s privacy interests in
cell phone contents by either misinterpreting or ignoring the full
effect of Robinson’s holding. In contrast, the trial court in
Smallwood confronted Robinson and showcased the tension
produced by the technological capabilities of mobile computing
that currently afflicts the search incident exception.
II. RESOLVING COURTS’ PROBLEMATIC REASONING IN THE
DEBATE OVER CELL PHONE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
When determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search
under the Fourth Amendment, “there is ‘no ready test . . . other
than by balancing the need to search . . . against the [privacy]
invasion which the search . . . entails.’” 96 In the context of searches
incident to arrest, the Court in United States v. Robinson
effectively ended this inquiry in favor of governmental interests.97
Robinson’s basic holding engendered significant criticism, 98 and
the introduction of cell phones has only further complicated the
situation.
Some state and federal cases and a wave of scholarly
disapproval have endeavored to curb the trend of allowing police
an unlimited right to search cell phones incident to arrest. Four
relevant arguments will be examined below. The first section
makes an attempt to distinguish cell phones from traditional
containers, and thereby exclude cell phones from the Robinson line
96

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“The authority to search the person incident to
a lawful custodial arrest . . . does not depend on what a court may later decide
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect . . . . It is the fact of the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”).
98
See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling the
majority’s approach “a clear and marked departure from our long tradition of
case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment”).
97
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of cases. The second section examines the misapplication of a
concept developed in United States v. Chadwick, which prevents
officers from searching property “not immediately associated with
the person of the arrestee.” The third section investigates a peculiar
jurisprudential dualism at work in Arizona v. Gant, and the
unjustifiability of applying its “reasonable-to-search” test to cell
phones. Finally, the last section critiques State v. Smith’s “brightline” reversal of Robinson’s ability to reach mobile phones.
A. The Irrelevance of Categorizing Cell Phones
as “Closed Containers”
Beginning with pagers, 99 a majority of courts have validated
warrantless searches of digital communications devices by
invoking the traditional analogy of the closed container, 100 thereby
recalling Supreme Court cases that expressly upheld searches
incident of closed containers. 101 While the higher Court rulings
unambiguously extended the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to
closed containers, nothing in those cases limited the search
incident to searches of closed containers. 102 Nevertheless, recent
court opinions have mistakenly sought to distinguish cell phones
from a traditional container analogy as a means of sidestepping the
bright-line rule embodied in Robinson and its line of cases. 103
State v. Smith’s exemption of cell phones from searches
incident relied in part on this attempt to distance cell phones from

99

See United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993), supra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
100
See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding the same for cell phones); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th
Cir. 1996) (finding that a pager is analogous to a closed container); United
States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding the
same); United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. Nev. 1991) (finding
computer memo book “indistinguishable from any other closed container”).
101
See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-809 (upholding
search of defendant’s clothing incident to arrest); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224-37
(upholding search of cigarette package incident to arrest).
102
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011).
103
See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.

308

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:4

physical containers. 104 In finding the analogy improper, Smith
turned to the definition of “container” relied on by the Supreme
Court, stating that containers “have traditionally been physical
objects capable of holding other physical objects. . . . ‘[C]ontainer’
means ‘any object capable of holding another object.’” 105 Because
cell phones do not “actually have a physical object within” them,
Smith held they are “not . . . closed container[s] for purposes of a
Fourth Amendment analysis.” 106
Two years after Smith, the California Supreme Court
conclusively demonstrated the irrelevance of any container inquiry
under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. 107 In People v. Diaz,
the court determined that “whether an item of personal property
constitutes a ‘container’ bears no relation” 108 to “the
reasonableness of searching for . . . evidence of crime when a
person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained.” 109
Instead, “application of [the search incident exception] turns . . . on
whether [the item] is ‘property,’ i.e., a ‘belonging[]’ or an
‘effect[].’” 110 For example, in upholding the search of the
arrestee’s cigarette package in Robinson, the Supreme Court
reasoned that “[h]aving in the course of a lawful search come upon
the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to
inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he
was entitled to seize them . . . .” 111 As the court in Smallwood v.
State observed of Robinson, “the search of an item found on an
arrestee was [not] contingent upon that item being a ‘container,’

104
105

See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009).
Id. at 954 (Ohio 2009) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460

(1981)).
106

Id. at 954 (Ohio 2009); see also Diaz, 244 P.3d at 517 (“Electronic
devices ‘contain’ information in a manner very different from [traditional
containers, and] are not even ‘containers’ within the meaning of the [Supreme
Court’s] search decisions.”) (citing Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (Ohio 2009))
(Werdegar, J., dissenting).
107
See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 510.
108
Id.
109
Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974)).
110
Id. (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803-04, 807-08).
111
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
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nor did the opinion even use the word ‘container.’” 112 Cases like
Diaz and Smallwood illustrate the error in assuming that
classification as a “container” has any impact on a police officer’s
ability to search a cell phone under Robinson’s bright-line rule.
B. Misapplication of United States v. Chadwick
Much of the confusion surrounding police authority to search
particular containers incident to arrest originates from United
States v. Chadwick. In determining the reasonableness of a police
search of a locked footlocker, the Supreme Court developed the
concept of items “not immediately associated with the person of
the arrestee.” 113 In respect to searches incident to arrest, the Court
held that:
[W]arrantless searches of luggage or other property
seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as
incident to that arrest either if the search is remote
in time or place from the arrest, . . . or no exigency
exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced
luggage or other personal property not immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger
that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that
property is no longer an incident of the arrest. 114
Because police had taken “exclusive dominion” of the footlocker,
and the search occurred 90 minutes after arresting the defendant,
the Court refused to justify the search as incident to the arrest. 115
Chadwick notably distinguished 116 the earlier rule of United States
v. Edwards, which validated the search of an arrestee’s clothing ten
hours after his arrest. 117 In so distinguishing, the Chadwick court
112
113
114
115
116
117

Smallwod v. State, 61 So.3d 448, 459 (Ct. App. Fla. 2011).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 16 n.10.
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805-09 (1974).
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noted “[u]nlike searches of the person . . . searches of possessions
within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any
reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.” 118
Some critics of searches of cell phones incident to arrest have
misinterpreted Chadwick’s “not-immediately-associated-with-theperson” concept as a device to except categorically cell phones
from searches incident. 119 Contrary to this view, Chadwick’s rule
on searches incident to arrest did not establish a bright line for
absolutely classifying property as either “immediately associated
with the person” or not. 120 Chadwick is better read as defining the
outer limit the “incident” of arrest. 121 Applying Chadwick’s test
therefore requires factual analysis centering primarily on the
circumstances of the arrest, seizure, and search, rather than the
general identity of the item. 122
While courts have interpreted Chadwick with little difficulty in
regard to purely spatial containers, such as purses 123 and
118

Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10.
See, e.g., Byron Kish, Cellphone Searches: Works Like A Computer,
Protected Like A Pager?, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 445 (recommending courts
“classify” cell phones as possessions not immediately associated with person of
arrestee).
120
For example, purses have generally, but not universally, been
interpreted as items associated with the person due to their proximity to the
arrestee. Compare People v. Mannozzi, 632 N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ct. App. Ill. 1994)
(finding purse immediately associated with person “because it is carried on the
person at all times”), with United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th
Cir. 1981) (rejecting search of purse incident to arrest when search occurred at
police station one hour after arrest and purse was “either in [defendant’s] hand,
on her lap, or on the seat of the car at the time of arrest”).
121
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can A Password Save
Your Cell Phone from A Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125,
1156 (2011) (“Edwards and Chadwick offer two different rules for the temporal
scope of searches incident to arrest.”).
122
See id. at 1161 (suggesting that categorization of item as associated
with the person or nearby possession “depends on the specific facts of the
case”).
123
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 760 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(finding search at police station valid under Edwards); People v. Mannozzi, 632
N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[A] purse, unlike a footlocker, has been
held to be an item immediately associated with the person of an arrestee,
because it is carried on the person at all times.”); People v. Harris, 164 Cal. Rptr.
119
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backpacks, 124 application of the rule to cell phones has produced
controversy. United States v. Finley embodies the leading authority
supporting the view that cell phones are possessions associated
with the person of the arrestee. 125 The Finley court reasoned that,
because the arrestee’s cell phone “was on his person at the time of
his arrest,” Edwards’s rule, rather than Chadwick’s, ought to
apply. 126 A majority of courts have applied Finley’s purely spatial
formulation of Chadwick’s distinction. 127
An opposing view originated in United States v. Park, which
concluded that mobile phones “should be considered ‘possessions
within an arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the
person.’” 128 Avoiding Finley’s preoccupation with physical
proximity to the arrestee, Park rested its conclusion on the
arrestee’s high privacy interests in the contents of the cell
phone. 129 Curiously, the Park court provided no explanation or
support for this absolute categorization.
Although Park’s finding is unpersuasive on its own, at least
one other case has held that Chadwick fundamentally requires an
analysis of privacy interests in the general class of item searched.
296 (Ct. App. 1980) (validating a search at a station house of a purse and wallet
contained within because under California law purses are considered regular
extensions of the person).
124
See People v. Boff, 766 P.2d 646, 651 n.9 (Col. 1988) (en banc)
(finding the search of a backpack at a station was valid under Edwards because
it “is more like a purse than a two-hundred pound double-locked footlocker”).
125
477 F.3d 250, 258-60 (5th Cir. 2007).
126
Id.
127
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (2011); United States v.
Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wurie, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (“I see no principled basis for distinguishing
a warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal
containers found on a defendant’s person that fall within the [Edwards]
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirements.”); United
States v. Curry, Criminal No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 WL 219966, at *10 (D. Me.
Jan. 23, 2008); United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-0167 WHA, 2006 WL
3193770, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006).
128
United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16
n.10 (1977)).
129
Id. at *8 (“This is so because modern cellular phones have the capacity
for storing immense amounts of private information.”).
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In United States v. Calandrella, the Sixth Circuit found the
arrestee’s briefcase was not associated with the person of the
arrestee because “the container’s ‘very purpose’ is to transport
papers and other items of an inherently personal, private
nature.” 130 However, contrary to Calandrella, the Supreme Court
in Chadwick made no indication that a footlocker’s typical
contents determined whether it was associated with the person. 131
In fact, Park’s holding actually contradicts accepted divisions
between Edwards and Chadwick. As one commentator points out,
a person’s wallet serves as an easy counterexample to Park’s
holding:
[C]onsider the enormous amount of information
police can obtain from searching a wallet—
generally held to be associated with the person of an
arrestee—including where the arrestee banks (via
his ATM card); where he shops (via his rewards
cards); whether he has any medical conditions (via
medical cards); pictures of his children; and more
scandalous information such as motel key cards,
condoms, or the phone number of his mistress.
These items do not cease to be on the person of an
arrestee simply because they convey a wealth of
information. 132
If Supreme Court precedent exists to exempt cell phones from the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, it does not reside in
Chadwick’s highly fact-oriented standard. While courts may use
Chadwick to invalidate certain searches of cell phones under the
right circumstances, Chadwick does not provide an absolute bar to
130

605 F.2d 236, 249 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting under Chadwick, “an
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a container
such as a footlocker which differs from the expectation of privacy associated
solely with the person.”); id. (relying on Chadwick’s assertion that “searches of
possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any
reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. [The arrestee’s] privacy
interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they
were under arrest.”) (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10).
131
See Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1.
132
See supra Gershowitz, note 126 at 1160.
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the practice.
C. The Arbitrariness of the Arizona v. Gant Standard
The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant 133 has
inspired some lower courts to take a different approach to limit cell
phones searches. Gant introduced a novel, two-prong standard for
searches of automobiles incident to arrest: “[p]olice may search a
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.” 134 Some courts have extended
Gant-like analyses to cell phones, 135 despite serious doctrinal
criticism of Gant’s holding and a tenuous analogical thread.
1. Doctrinal Ambivalence in Arizona v. Gant
The Gant decision sought to remedy dissatisfaction over
Belton’s broad allowance of searches of passenger compartments
of cars incident to arrest. 136 The replacement, which all but
eliminated Belton’s bright-line rule, 137 was adopted from a position
advocated by Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurrence in

133

556 U.S. 332 (2009); see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
135
See, e.g., United States v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, slip op., 2009 WL
2424104, at *3 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009) (invalidating cell phone search incident
to arrest because not reasonable for officer to believe evidence of drug
conspiracy in phone contents); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291,
1299-1301 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (holding the same).
136
See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351-52 (“The experience of the 28 years since we
decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading
of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger
compartment are rarely within the area into which an arrestee might reach . . .
and blind adherence to Belton's faulty assumption would authorize myriad
unconstitutional searches.”).
137
Id. at 343 n.4 (“Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe
arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable
to fully effectuate an arrest so that the real possibility of access to the arrestee’s
vehicle remains.”).
134
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Thornton v. United States. 138 In Thornton, Justice Scalia based his
“reason to believe” test on the distinction that, in contrast to
Robinson cases (where the fact of arrest justifies the search), “in
the context of a general evidence-gathering search, the state
interests [expressed in Chimel] that might justify any overbreadth
[sic] are far less compelling.” 139 However, Justice Scalia’s
justification for these “general evidence-gathering” searches
incident to arrest remains suspect. Scalia defended these searches,
such as the one used in United States v. Rabinowitz, 140 stating:
There is nothing irrational about broader police
authority to search for evidence when and where the
perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested. The fact
of prior lawful arrest distinguishes the arrestee from
society at large, and distinguishes a search for
evidence of his crime from general rummaging.
Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that evidence
of a crime is most likely to be found where the
suspect was apprehended. 141
Professor Wayne LaFave has cast serious doubt on the merits
of these assertions, finding them “totally lacking in substance.”142
Perhaps more significantly, the justification Justice Scalia relied on
—that the Fourth Amendment arguably accommodates purely
“evidence-gathering” searches incident to arrest—necessarily
opposes the twin policy interests adopted by Chimel to limit those
searches. 143 In spite of this incompatibility, the Gant majority in
nearly the same breath purports to adhere to Chimel while also
supporting Justice Scalia’s rule. 144 For this reason, the Gant
dissenters criticized the majority for “rais[ing] doctrinal . . .
138

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (“I would . . . limit
Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”) (Scalia, J., concurring).
139
Id.
140
339 U.S. 56 (1950) (upholding search incident of one-room office
space), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
141
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630.
142
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 7.1 (4th ed. 2011).
143
Id. After all, Chimel overruled Rabinowitz.
144
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
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problems.” 145 As Justice Alito’s dissent emphasizes, the
Rabinowitz line of cases Justice Scalia relied upon in Thornton
were overruled by Chimel. 146 While Gant accomplishes the
intended goal of narrowing Belton, “‘better than Belton’ is hardly
high praise,” and its “two-faced” loyalty to Chimel leaves Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence visibly fractured. 147
As with Gant’s automobile, there is simply little theoretical
justification for applying Gant’s “reason to believe” rule to cell
phones. Unsurprisingly, lower courts using the rule in the context
of cell phones expose little of their reasoning. In United States v.
Quintana, a district court suppressed evidence gained from the
search of a cell phone of an individual incident to an arrest for
driving with a suspended license. Although Quintana was decided
while Gant was still pending, Quintana introduced a similar, yet
even broader, rule that “a search incident to arrest to preserve
evidence is permissible only to secure evidence of the crime of
arrest, not evidence of an unrelated crime.” 148 Quintana
purportedly derived its rule from Knowles v. Iowa, 149 though the
court’s true inspiration came from Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion in Thornton.150
When it came time for the court to apply its novel rule to the
case at hand, however, the court inexplicably fell back upon an
evaluation of Chimel’s rationales. “The search of the contents of
Defendant’s cell phone had nothing to do with officer safety or the
preservation of evidence related to the crime of arrest. This type of
145

Id. at 364 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also James J. Tomkovicz,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1459 (2007) (“Justice Scalia's historical case for the
evidence-gathering justification for searches incident to arrest is hardly
compelling, [as it] provides no genuine insight into the Framers' attitudes toward
the authority to search private spaces where arrestees are found.”).
146
See Gant, 556 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting).
147
See LaFave, supra note 147.
148
United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla.
2009).
149
525 U.S. 113 (1998) (invalidating search of car incident to traffic stop
not involving custodial arrest).
150
Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1300. The opinion went so far as to
support its reasoning with corroborating comments made by Justice Scalia
during oral arguments for Gant.
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search is not justified by the twin rationales of Chimel and pushes
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine beyond its limits.”151
Although decided before Gant, Quintana’s approach highlights the
confusion surrounding the test Justice Scalia envisioned in
Thornton. Instead of arriving at an application of this test through
cogent analysis, supporters abuse the “reason to believe” standard
as a shortcut to their goal of avoiding the reach of Robinson and
limiting searches of cell phones incident to arrest. 152
2. The Problem of Analogizing Gant
Even if we tolerate Gant’s underlying ambivalence toward
Chimel, the more practical problem remains of properly
analogizing vehicles and cell phones. Gant involved, of course, the
search of a vehicle incident to the occupant’s arrest. Central to its
justification for espousing Justice Scalia’s Thornton rule was the
majority’s consideration of the “circumstances unique to the
vehicle context.” 153 Apart from the Court’s use of the word
“unique”—suggesting Gant’s rule is limited to automobiles—the
opinion yields almost no explanation of what those circumstances
are, and how those facts necessitate Gant’s holding. One clue
might arise from the Court’s disapproval of Belton’s
undervaluation of individuals’ privacy interests in cars. 154 The
151

Id.
See, e.g., H. Morley Swingle, Smartphone Searches Incident to Arrest,
68 J. MO. B. 36, 38 (2012) (“The Gant ‘evidence-related-to-crime-of-arrest’
analysis provides a workable framework to apply to searches of smartphones
incident to arrest.”); Jana L. Knott, Is There An App for That? Reexamining The
Doctrine of Search Incident to Lawful Arrest in The Context of Cell Phones, 35
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 445, 477 (“A rule allowing officers to search a cell phone
incident to lawful arrest if they have reason to believe evidence of the offense of
arrest will be found in the phone prevents courts from having to fashion a
completely new rule based on the technology of cell phones. With such a rule,
the focus is less on the type of phone, the features of a particular phone, or
whether the phone is a smart phone or a basic cell phone, but rather the focus for
courts is whether the officer had reason to believe that evidence of crime would
be stored in the phone.”).
153
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 364 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
154
Id. at 344-45 (“[T]he State seriously undervalues the privacy interests
152
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Gant Court expressed concern over a “serious and recurring threat
to privacy”—namely an “unbridled discretion to rummage”—
arising “whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic
offense.” 155 However, if a concern for privacy was the
determinative issue, it is not clear why the Court did not simply
fall back on a probable cause standard through the automobile
exception. 156 Gant’s vague reasoning provides no workable basis
upon which to rest an analogy between a cell phone and an
automobile.
D. State v. Smith, Smallwood v. State, and the
Insufficiency of a High Expectation of Privacy to
Preclude a Search Incident to Arrest
1. State v. Smith
Modern cell phones’ ability to grant access to enormous
amounts of personal information and media begs the question of
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment. In the words of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio:
Even the simplest of today’s cell phones do more
than just make and receive telephone calls.
Typically, they have the capability of sending,
receiving, and storing text messages. They have
built in cameras and can take pictures, send them
wirelessly to others, and store them. They record
not only phone numbers that people intentionally
at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his
vehicle is less substantial than in his home . . . the former interest is nonetheless
important and deserving of constitutional protection.”).
155
Id. at 345.
156
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (“It would be
intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully
using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search . . . .
[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a
right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a
competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.”).
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left for them, as do pagers, but lists of both numbers
called and numbers from which calls were received,
commonly with details of both date/time and call
duration. More sophisticated phones contain
complete address books, appointment calendars,
and e-mail. And they can surf the internet. People
store everything from recipes and shopping lists to
pictures of their children and their social security
and bank account numbers on their cell phones.
When the phones are used by employees, they often
contain highly confidential business information.
Rather than pagers, today's cellular phones are
properly analogized to a combination telephone,
office safe, and laptop computer. 157
Digital communication and data use through cell phones are
growing in our society. In 2011, 331.6 million “wireless subscriber
connections” were active in the United States. 158 That number
equated to 104.6 percent penetration in 2011, compared to 76.6
percent in 2006, and 44.2 percent in 2001. 159 Another 2011 figure
estimated 40 percent of U.S. mobile phone users owning
multimedia-centered smartphones. 160 Courts have consistently
recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone
contents. 161 Increasingly, courts have given greater recognition to
cell phones’ immense storage capabilities. 162
157

Merit Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation,
Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Antwaun Smith at 6, State v. Smith,
920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
158
Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/wireless-quick-facts.
159
Id.
160
Don Kellogg, 40 Percent of U.S. Mobile Users Own Smartphones; 40
Percent are Android, NIELSONWIRE (Sept. 1, 2011), http://blog.nielsen.com/
nielsenwire/online_mobile/40-percent-of-u-s-mobile-users-own-smartphones40-percent-are-android/.
161
See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007).
162
See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009); United
States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 2424104, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23
2007); State v. Smith 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009); Smallwood v. State, 61
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As described above, the Ohio Supreme Court made history in
2009 as the first high court to prohibit categorically searches of
cell phones incident to arrest. 163 The court held in State v. Smith
that modern cell phones’ immense storage capabilities created an
expectation of privacy high enough to entirely exclude all cell
phones from searches incident to arrest. 164 The Smith court found
that, because nothing about the search of the phone implicated
either officer safety or preservation of evidence, and because of the
high privacy interest in the phone’s contents, “an officer may not
conduct a search of a cell phone’s contents incident to a lawful
arrest without first obtaining a warrant.” 165 Apart from an initial
citation to United States v. Katz,166 the Smith court arrived at its
conclusion without referencing a single case.
Smith’s silence on prior authority is unsurprising, since none
actually supports the court’s conclusion. In fact, as the Supreme
Court of California identified two years later in People v. Diaz, 167
controlling precedent actually opposes the reasoning used by
Smith. Although it did not directly address the Smith opinion, Diaz
confronted many of the arguments used by the Ohio court. Diaz
primarily questioned why “the sheer quantity of personal
information [stored on cell phones] should be determinative,”
when smaller containers may still “contain highly personal,
intimate and private information.” 168 Diaz noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court has approved of lower court decisions allowing
officers to search the contents of papers incident to arrest. 169
So.3d 448, 461 (Ct. App. Fla. 2011).
163
State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
164
Id. at 955 (“[Cell phones’] ability to store large amounts of private data
gives their uses a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of
privacy in the information they contain.”).
165
Id. (distinguishing the functionality of cell phones from computers).
But see id. (declining to distinguish between so-called “standard” cell phones
and those with more functions and storage).
166
Id.
167
244 P.3d 501 (2011).
168
Id. at 507-08.
169
See id. (citing United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, n.4
(1974)); see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283, 1285–87 (5th
Cir. 1970) (upholding search incident of papers contained in pockets, wallets,
and purse); United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1967)
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Boiling down precedent from Belton and Robinson, Diaz argued:
[T]he salient point of the high [C]ourt’s decisions is
that a lawful custodial arrest justifies the
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee
may have in property immediately associated with
his or her person at the time of arrest . . . even if
there is no reason to believe the property contains
weapons or evidence. 170
How Smith’s holding—based on a heightened expectation of
privacy in cell phones—can survive within the jurisprudential
environment Diaz describes is perplexing. Tellingly, Smith avoids
any discussion of Robinson within the section pertinent to its
holding. 171 Robinson would seem to foreclose any inquiry into
expectations of privacy or into the type of property searched, as
well as Smith’s analysis of Chimel’s twin justifications for a
search. 172 In short, Smith’s rule fundamentally conflicts with
longstanding Supreme Court precedent defining the valid scope of
searches incident to arrest.
Smith’s failure to delimit the proper subject of its ruling also
raises significant questions as to real-world law enforcement.
While Smith addressed a particular search incident of a “standard”
cell phone, it chose to bundle all mobile phones under its term
“cell phone,” while neglecting to define any fundamental
characteristics a “cell phone” must possess. At most, the court
distinguished “cell phones” from address books and laptop
computers. 173 In response to this broad umbrella, Diaz asked the
(diary); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967) (papers
contained in pockets); Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 1964)
(paper contained in wallet).
170
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 508 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (quotation marks omitted)).
171
See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954-55 (Ohio 2009).
172
See id. at 955 (“A search of the cell phone’s contents was not necessary
to ensure officer safety, and the state failed to present any evidence that the call
records and phone numbers were subject to imminent destruction.”).
173
See id. (“[C]ell phones are neither address books nor laptop computers.
They are more intricate and multifunctional than traditional address books, yet
they are still, in essence, phones, and thus they are distinguishable from laptop
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practical questions: “How would an officer in the field determine
whether the item’s storage capacity is constitutionally significant?
And how would an officer in the field determine this question upon
arresting a suspect?” 174 Of course, an argument exists that, based
on the integration of increasing local storage capacities and
“cloud” storage into modern cell phones, 175 Diaz’s questions
quickly will become irrelevant.
However, Smith still failed to answer the more fundamental
questions of “why cell phones, and why now?” Smith provided no
practicable guidance regarding the point at which other forms of
property might contain enough personal information to allow for a
heightened expectation of privacy to require a similar exemption
from searches incident. The most we know from Smith is that,
somewhere between an address book and a laptop computer,
property becomes imbued with a heightened expectation of
privacy. Instead of confronting the perceived flaws of current
Fourth Amendment search incident doctrine and attempting to
better define the scope of the search incident exception in the
digital age, Smith merely carved out an unsound shelter for a vague
category of technology using reasoning that, as Diaz made clear,
conflicts with established Supreme Court precedent.
2. Smallwood v. State
In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court answered the appellate

computers.”).
174
Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508; see also United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405,
411 (4th Cir. 2009) (refusing to distinguish cell phones based on “large” storage
capacity because of difficulty of quantifying that term “in any meaningful
way”).
175
At the time of writing, the largest capacity available in Apple’s “iPhone
4S” is 64 gigabytes. See Select an iPhone 4S, APPLE (2012),
http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop_iphone/family/iphone/iphone4s.
The first iPhone, introduced in 2007, held a capacity of only 4 gigabytes. The
iPhone software “iCloud” allows users to store music files, photographs,
documents, applications, calendars, and contact information in Apple’s servers
for remote access from their iPhones. See iCloud, APPLE (2012),
http://www.apple.com/iphone/icloud/.
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court’s “question of great public importance” 176 with a reversal, 177
using language closely echoing State v. Smith. The court began its
inquiry by entirely rejecting the relevance of Robinson to the facts
of Smallwood v. State. The court distinguished Robinson on the
grounds that Robinson was “neither factually nor legally on point”
with the issue presented in Smallwood. 178 The court based its
distinction on a comparison of the property searched in each case,
ultimately finding that Robinson’s crumpled cigarette pack and
Smallwood’s mobile phone factually dissimilar enough to prevent
Robinson’s holding from applying. To this effect, the court stated
“[i]n our view, attempting to correlate a crumpled package of
cigarettes to the cell phones of today is like comparing a one-cell
organism to a human being. The two objects are patently
incomparable because of the obvious and expansive differences
between them.” 179 In particular, the cell phone’s ability to grant
access to “extensive information and data” sufficiently departed
from Robinson’s set of facts to prevent Robinson’s holding from
controlling. 180
The Court’s line of inquiry suggests that, when evaluating the
propriety of a search of personal items incident to arrest, courts
ought to inquire into the nature and characteristics of the property.
However, Robinson makes no suggestion that the validity of the
search depended in any way upon the character of the property
searched. To the contrary, Robinson suggests characteristics of
property are an improper factor for courts to consider:
The authority to search the person incident to lawful
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend
on what a court may later decide was the probability
in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of

176

Smallwood v. State, 61 So.3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see supra
notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
177
Smallwood v. State, 113 So.3d 724 (Fla. 2013).
178
Id. at 730.
179
Id. at 732.
180
Id. at 731.
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the suspect. 181
Robinson’s bright-line rule supported policy considerations that
police officers’ subjective beliefs about the evidentiary weight of
certain items or the dangerousness of certain arrestees should be
removed from search incident to arrest procedure. 182 In contrast to
the Florida Supreme Court’s fixation on the particular
characteristics of the searched item, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Robinson explicitly refused to evaluate the particular facts of the
arrestee or the items uncovered in the course of the resulting
search. Federal precedent therefore requires that the rule developed
in Robinson and its line of cases should apply regardless of the
type of property at issue.
3. Smallwood and Smith: Common Problems
The Smallwood and Smith holdings rely on a common tactic of
ignoring the full effect of Robinson or, in the Smallwood situation,
entirely rejecting its relevance, in order to apply a heightened
expectation of privacy to cell phones. As demonstrated by Diaz
and the Florida Court of Appeals, the assumption that Robinson
has no factual application to searches of cell phones is misguided.
If we accept that a cell phone constitutes property, and that it was
located on the suspect’s person at the time of arrest, then nothing
prevents Robinson from applying to its search incident to an arrest.
In addition to misinterpreting the reach of Robinson’s rule, the
Smallwood and Smith courts fail to define the scope of their own
holdings. The Smallwood court concluded that “electronic devices
that operate as cell phones of today” cannot be treated according to
Robinson’s rule. 183 The court supplies only nebulous
interpretations of the term “cell phone” and what technology
suffices to protect an electronic device from searches incident to
arrest. The court’s conclusion hinged on distinguishing the “vast
nature of the information” available through a modern cell phone
181

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973).
See id. at 236 (“[I]t is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate
any subjective fear of [the arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the
arrestee] was armed.”).
183
Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 732.
182
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from the “limited-capacity” and “non-interactive” cigarette packet
in Robinson. 184 Of course, a stark distinction is easy when the only
points of comparison are a modern mobile device and a small
cardboard box. But deciding what kind of rule to apply becomes
more difficult when comparing different mobile devices which do
not lend themselves to easy categorization. Increasingly,
electronics are being produced to fit any functional niche for which
a market exists: laptops, tablet computers, smartphones, featurephones, wearable devices with Bluetooth connections, digital
cameras with wireless Internet capabilities, e-readers, and so on.
The technologies of these gadgets can both overlap and vary
greatly.
Even if the Smallwood and Smith decisions tend to sympathize
with the general public’s expectation of privacy in mobile devices,
they ignore decades of case law on an established exception to the
warrant requirement to search property. Other states should take
these cases as examples of improper solutions to this complex
issue. The following section explores two possible avenues that do
not undermine the judiciary’s credibility.
III. RECONNECTING WITH CHIMEL: TWO APPROACHES FORWARD
Despite the persistent mess of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, 185 some “fundamental principles” 186 remain
relatively unquestioned in the context of searches incident to
arrest. 187 One of those principles maintains that “in order for a
search incident to arrest to be reasonable as opposed to merely
exploratory, it must be grounded in at least one of the rationales for
which the exception was created: officer safety or the preservation
of evidence.” 188 If we accept these two justifications as the basis of
184

Id.
See LaFave, supra note 1 (“The [Fourth] Amendment . . . continues to
spawn a seemingly endless stream of litigation; as some issues are finally put to
rest, still others surface and cry out for litigation.”).
186
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (referring to principles
established in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
187
But see Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 631-32 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
188
United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
185
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governmental interest in searches incident to arrest, whatever
approach is taken toward cell phones and other digital devices
must incorporate them. Two possible methods of resolution are
discussed here: one judicially based solution, and another
legislatively based avenue.
A. Judicial Solution: Limit Robinson’s Scope
Although it would depart from the present categorical search
incident rule developed in Robinson, 189 this Article recommends
that courts adopt a rule similar to one proposed by Professor
Stephen Saltzburg:. 190 His rule is that during a search of the person
of the arrestee incident to lawful arrest, (1) once an officer
determines that a piece of property seized from the arrestee
contains nothing posing a risk to officer safety, (2) the officer may
continue searching that item only if (a) the possibility reasonably
exists that the item contains evidence related to the crime of arrest,
and (b) the arrestee remains capable of accessing the item. 191 If
either of the last two criteria are unfulfilled during the search, the
officer must refrain from further intrusion and seek a warrant for
the particular item. 192
This rule offers courts numerous advantages. First, it centers
the focus of a search incident analysis to the foundational,
exigency-based tenets of Chimel v. California. 193 It is well
established that a warrantless search must be “strictly
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)) (Trott, J., concurring).
189
See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
190
See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue
Code or Body of Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 980 (2006) (“(1) an
officer always may search the arrested person for weapons and search any
container from which the suspect could get a weapon; (2) once an officer has
determined that a suspect has no weapon or has disarmed the suspect, the officer
may only continue to search a container for evidence as long as there is some
possibility that it contains evidence and the suspect remains capable of opening
the container and destroying the contents; and (3) thereafter, the officer may
only seize a container to bring before a magistrate in order to seek a warrant to
search it further.”).
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
395 U.S. 752 (1969); see supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
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circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”194
Cell phones naturally carry no threat to officer safety. When a cell
phone is seized from the arrestee and the arrestee has no ability to
regain control of the device, the officer has fulfilled Chimel’s
second exigency justification of preserving evidence. Some courts
have pointed to the potential of incoming calls or messages to
overwrite stored data, or for an accomplice to remotely wipe a
phone’s content. 195 While these observations may hold merit, such
questions require highly technical examinations of different
devices’ technologies and countermeasures. Such inquiries extend
beyond the scope of this Article.
The above rule would intentionally limit an officer’s ability to
peruse the written content papers or visual content of photographs
found on the person of the arrestee. The exigency argument for
searching the contents of physical papers is even weaker than for
electronic media because there is no threat of data loss. Absent
peculiar circumstances threatening to destroy the papers, a search
of such documents would require a warrant.
Second, the proposed rule returns the scope of searches
incident to offense-specific evidence preservation—an approach
that better reflects early search incident procedure. 196 While the
exact point at which this historical limitation of searches incident
to arrest dropped out of Supreme Court jurisprudence is unclear,
Robinson unambiguously heralded the Court’s interpretation of an
“unqualified” ability of police to search. Parting ways with
Robinson’s unqualified “general authority” in favor of the earlier
“crime of arrest” approach would more closely approximate the
Framers’ understanding of a reasonable search incident to arrest.
As Professor LaFave writes, “it is unfortunate that Justice
Rehnquist [in Robinson] did not give closer attention to the
question of whether such a broad search-incident-to-arrest rule is
warranted [by prior Supreme Court decisions].” 197 Again, this
194

Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 26 (1968).
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807–9 (7th Cir.
2012) (discussing possibility of “remote-wiping” of phone and rejecting
practicality of preventative measures by officers).
196
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
197
LaFave, supra note 147, at § 5.2.
195
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subject calls for greater examination elsewhere.
Third, this rule ultimately acknowledges the public’s high
expectation of privacy in their mobile devices 198 while avoiding
the line-drawing problems that plagued State v. Smith. 199 The topic
of cell phone searches incident to arrest has received significant
and generally negative attention from public interest
organizations 200 and the technology community, 201 indicating a
widespread and high public expectation of privacy in information
accessible through digital devices. Finally, this rule by design is
not limited to “cell phones,” which are a technology in flux and
already can be seen functionally overlapping with other portable
computers, such as laptops and tablets.
B. Legislative Solution: Bypass Judicial Indecision
Given the improbability of a court narrowing Robinson’s
bright-line rule, state legislatures provide a better avenue for
greater protection of digital devices. The California Legislature’s
attempt to limit searches of cell phones 202 drew the attention of
news media. 203 The bill produced even greater response after
California governor Jerry Brown vetoed it amid speculation of
political motivations to support law enforcement interests. 204 In a
198

See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
200
See, e.g., Elizabeth Wong, Can You Hear Me Now? Get A Warrant!,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA (June 3, 2011, 11:54
AM), http:// va.org/7617/can-you-hear-me-now-get-a-warrant; Searches
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
Incident
to
Arrest,
ELECTRONIC
https://www.eff.org/issues/search-incident-arrest (last visited April 19, 2012).
201
See, e.g., Ryan Radia, Why you should always encrypt your
smartphone, ARS TECHNICA (“published about a year ago”),
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/guides/2011/01/why-you-should-always-encryptyour-smartphone.ars.
202
S.B. 914, 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), http://info.sen.ca.gov/
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terse written message the public, Governor Brown explained his
veto that “[t]his measure would overturn a California Supreme
Court decision that held that police officers can lawfully search the
cell phones of people who they arrest. The courts are better suited
to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to
constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” 205 The case Brown
referred to was People v. Diaz. 206
In response, Professor Orin Kerr addressed what he saw as
Brown’s misplaced reliance on the courts in this context:
I think Governor Brown has it exactly backwards. It
is very difficult for courts to decide Fourth
Amendment
cases
involving
developing
technologies like cell phones. Changing technology
is a moving target, and courts move slowly: They
are at a major institutional disadvantage in striking
the balance properly when technology is in flux . . .
. In contrast, legislatures have a major institutional
advantage over courts in this setting. They can
better assess facts, more easily amend the law to
reflect the latest technology, are not stuck following
precedents, can adopt more creative regulatory
solutions, and can act without a case or controversy.
For these reasons, legislatures are much better
equipped than courts to strike the balance between
security and privacy when technology is in flux. 207
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Unbound by stare decisis and capable of easily revising their rules
to adapt to changes in the technological world, legislatures likely
provide a better channel than the courts to effect this kind of
reform.
CONCLUSION
As cell phones and future iterations of mobile computing
become more portable, more powerful, and more convenient, the
public will increasingly rely on them to organize and access
personal information. While devices like cell phones might store a
great amount of personal information, our right to the privacy of
that information during custodial arrests is not supported by
Supreme Court case law. Numerous arguments have been made to
limit police access to the contents of cell phones during searches
incident to arrest. 208 Although not all have been addressed by this
Article, I have attempted to show that many of these arguments are
either in direct opposition to Supreme Court precedent, or lack a
persuasive rationale for adopting them. In response, this Article
recommends two possible approaches for limiting police authority
to search cell phones incident to arrest. The first is judicially
based. 209 While the rule itself challenges the application of United
States v. Robinson 210 to digital devices, I have attempted to rest it
on established and desirable policy goals. 211 Alternatively, state
legislatures enacting statutory protections offer faster, more
adaptable, and better informed means of regulating these
searches. 212 Whatever method is used should reestablish contact
with the search-incident-to-an-arrest exception’s foundational
policy goals as expressed in Chimel v. California. 213
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208
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210
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